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China has experienced transformation from an agricultural based economy to the 
manufacturing workshop of the world on a scale and rapidity that is unprecedented.  The 
associated relocation of the population from relatively low density rural areas to very high 
density urban areas is having a significant impact on the quantity and quality of water 
available as inputs into the production and consumption process, as well as the ability of 
the water system to absorb and neutralize the waste byproducts deposited into it.  Water 
shortages are most severe in the north of the country, where surface water diversion is 
excessive and groundwater is being depleted.  In addition, the quality of water is 
deteriorating because of pollution, thereby aggravating existing water shortages. 
 
The biggest challenge ahead will be for national and local governments to craft policies 
and rules within China’s complex cultural and legal administrative system that provide 
incentives for users to increase efficiency of water use, and for polluters to clean up the 
water they use and return clean water to stream flows. Using a standard public economics 
framework, water requirements for public goods – such as ecosystem needs – should be set 
aside first, before allocating property rights in water (to enable water markets to function 
and generate efficient allocation signals). Even then, water markets will have to be 
regulated to ensure public goods, such as public health, are not compromised. Until water 
markets are implemented, staying the course on increasing water and wastewater prices 
administratively and encouraging water conservation are necessary to reduce the wasting 
of current scarce water resources, as well as the new water supplies to be provided in the 
future.    
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1.   Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the issues and options for 
addressing water problems in China.  It is organized in five sections.  Section 1 briefly 
introduces the growing water scarcity in China. Section 2 describes trends in water supply 
and notes that these are best understood in spatial terms. Section 3 describes trends in 
water demand and notes that these are best understood in sectoral terms. Section 4 
discusses policy and investment implications, and section 5 concludes. 
 
1.1.1 Per Capita Availability of Water Is Low by International Standards 
 
China’s total naturally available water flows (not stocks) from all surface and underground 
sources is estimated at approximately 2,812 billion m³ (BCM) per annum, and ranked sixth 
in the world behind Brazil, Russia, Canada, Indonesia, and the U.S.3. However, on a per 
capita basis China’s naturally available water flow per annum of 2,206 m³/person in 2004 
is one of the lowest levels in the world for a populous country (next to India’s at 1,754 
m³/person)4. China’s per capita naturally available water per annum is one-third of the 
average of the developing countries (7,762 m³/person), one-fourth of the world average 
(8,549 m³/person), and almost one-fifth of the U.S. average (10,332 m³/person)5.  So in a 
global context China's per capita availability of water is exceedingly low, suggesting the 
potential for water stress as demand for usable water rises with growth in population and in 
per capita incomes.     
 
1.1.2 Population Growth Is Reducing “Per Capita Availability of Water” 
 
For analytic purposes, the natural supply of water in China can be assumed constant 
(barring major climatic changes and retreat of glaciers, major desalinization programs, or 
major transfers of water from neighboring countries). By contrast, despite the one child 
policy, China's population has been growing steadily from about one billion in 1980 to 
1.19 billion in 1993 and 1.29 billion in 2003  (Table 1.1).   
 
80-93 93-03 80-03
billion % billion % billion % % % %
TOTAL 0.99      100 1.19      100 1.29      100 1.3 0.8 1.1
North 0.42     43 0.48     41 0.54     42 1.0 1.0 1.1
South 0.58     58 0.66     55 0.75     58 0.9 1.2 1.1
Urban 0.19 19 0.33 28 0.52 40 4.0 4.2 4.3
Rural 0.80 81 0.85 72 0.77 60 0.5 -0.9 -0.1
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 1991, 2004
1980






                                                 
3 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) AQUASTAT database (World Resources Institute) and USDA.     
4 USDA. 2000. P.25. 
5 FAO AQUASTAT (World Resources Institute)   5
As a result, China's annual p.c. water availability has dropped by 23% in the last two 
decades (from 2,849 m³/person in 1980 to 2,180 m³/person in 2003).   
 
1.1.3 China Will Soon Become the Most Water Stressed Country in East and 
Southeast Asia 
 
There are a number of definitions commonly used in the literature, to describe water 
stresses and shortages. The International Water Management Institute (IWMI) uses a four-
part scale to classify countries in terms of their overall water use.  A) Low exploitation: 
<20%; B) Comfortable range: 20-59%; C) Environmentally overexploited: 60-100%; D) 
Mining: >100%6. The denominator in the ratio includes naturally available flows of water 
(i.e. all surface and underground water flows) based on annual precipitation in a 
jurisdiction. But it excludes stocks/reserves (in dams, as well as, surface and underground 
lakes), which can be used to buffer periodic climatic shocks. The ratio can exceed 100% 
when the latter are drawn down routinely for normal use rather than to cope with shocks. 
The numerator in the ratio includes the average amount of water used for all human 
activities (production and consumption – including amenities), plus water needs of the 
ecosystem (estimated to range between 25-40% of normal flows of surface and 
underground water).  
 
The UNDP, UNEP, World Bank and the World Resources Institute define “water stress” 
on a per capita basis as annual water availability of 2,000 m³/person or less. In this 
framework “water scarcity” is defined as 1,000 m³/person7 or less. The water consumed 
per person (from all sources – surface and aquifer) includes not only what is normally 
classified as domestic/residential water consumption per capita, but also the individual’s 
share of national water consumed for productive activities – agriculture and industry – and 
the individual’s share of water required for ecosystem needs (flushing channels, supporting 
aquatic life, etc.). 
 
Using the per capita definition (of the UNDP, UNEP, World Bank, WRI) China as a whole 
will be classified as water stressed by 2010 at the current rate of population growth.  Using 
the IWMI’s classification, China currently uses 44% of its water and is still within the 
“comfortable” water use margin, but its use of water is projected to exceed 60% by 20208, 
putting it in the “environmentally overexploited” category.  Thus, by either definition, 
China will face a potentially serious water management problem in the coming decades. 
 
The water use percentages cited above are substantially higher than the ratio of what is 
recorded as “Water Use”9 in Chinese statistics relative to the total natural availability of 
water -- currently on the order of 20 %  (see Table 1.2).  
 
                                                 
6 WDR 2003a. p.87. 
7 There are other definitions, e.g. by Dr. Malin Falkenmark, who defines water stress as 1,700 m³ per person 
and water scarcity as 1,000 m³ per person (Robert 1993).  Economy. 2004. p 287 and WDR 2003. p.48. 
8 International Water Management Institute (IWMI), cited in WDR 2003a. p.87. 
9 Water Use is akin to Aggregate Demand and defined as the sum of demand for water in production 
<agriculture plus industry> and in consumption <rural plus urban households> and is discussed in more 
detail in a later section.   6
 
BCM % BCM % BCM % BCM %
TOTAL 2,812         100 444            16    519            18 550 20
Surface 2,712         96
Aquifer 829            29
North 405            14 163            40    188            46 196 48
Surface 334            12
Aquifer 168            6
South 2,406         86 281            12    330            14 354 15
Surface 2,376         84
Aquifer 659            23
* The sum of surface and aquifer water exceeds the total water resources by the amount of overlap between them
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 1991, 2003 and ESCAP (Annex 2)
2000 1980 1993
Table 1.2       China Water: Availability and Use
Water Availability*   
(gross)
Water Use  (%: relative to Water Availability)
 
 
The latter figure superficially suggests that there is substantial scope for expanding water 
use in China. However, such a conclusion is not warranted because: 
•  The aggregate use figures refer only to flows tapped for human use and do not 
include flows required for ecosystem maintenance. 
•  The data on gross availability exceeds the amount of water that actually can be 
harnessed for human use (i.e. in a “cost-effective” way based on “known”/current 
technologies). The latter figure is not published even if it is known. Without it, it is 
difficult to meaningfully analyze the scope for expanding supply nationwide 
(whether provided through public or private suppliers, or on own account) relative 
to the growing demand for water. 
•  The spatial distribution of water supply and demand are quite different, and costly 
to overcome. At the sub-national level there are already areas exhibiting not just 
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2.  Trends in Water Availability / Supply Is Manifested Most 
Clearly in Spatial Terms 
 
2.1 Water Quantity -- Is Inadequate 
 
2.1.1 Water Shortages Are Most Acute in the North 
 
China’s low natural availability of water per person of 2,180 m³ in 2003 masks substantial 
regional disparities in water availability10. Demand for water is growing throughout the 
country -- but availability in the north is about a quarter that in the south  -- 757 m³/person 
vs. 3,208 m³/person respectively (see Table 2.1) -- and a tenth of the world average11.  The 
757 m³/person in the North in 2003 qualifies the North as a whole as an area of ‘water 
scarcity’, which is a condition worse than ‘water stress’. Yet the North is a very large area. 
It is home to roughly 42% of China’s population in 2003 -- 538 million people (greater 
than the total population in Europe or in Latin America) -- with access to only 14% of 
China’s water resources (Table 2.1).     
 
BCM % 1980 1993 2003 1980 1993 2003
TOTAL 2,812             100 0.99       1.19       1.29       2,849       2,373       2,180      
Surface 2,712             96
Aquifer 829                29
North 405               14 0.42      0.48      0.54      964         838         757        
Surface 334                12
Aquifer 168                6
South 2,406            86 0.58      0.66      0.75      4,176      3,665      3,208     
Surface 2,376             84
Aquifer 659                23
* The sum of surface and aquifer water exceeds the total water resources by the amount of overlap between them
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 1991, 2003 and ESCAP (Annex 2)
Water Availability*      
(gross)
Population                  
(billion)
Water Availability per capita       
(m³)













                                                 
10 Average rainfall is approximately nine times more in the southeast (1,800 mm) than in the northwest (200 
mm), and over 45% of China receives less than 400 mm precipitation a year. Economy. 2004. p.68. 
11 Wang and Somik. 2002. p.759.   8
Table 2.2 shows the gross renewable water resources available in each of the nine major 
externally draining river basins in China.  As shown, generally surface runoff dominates 
underground water flows in all the basins. But in the North water use relative to 
availability is often three to four times as high as in the South -- -- in the Hai river basin it 




BCM 1980 1993 2000 1980 1993 2000
TOTAL 2,812           444        519        550        16     18     20    
North 405              163        188        197        40     46     49    
Surface 334              114        34    
Aquifer 168              50          30    
Song-Liao 193              35          50          57          18     26     30    
Surface 165             29         17    
Aquifer 62               9           14    
Hai-Luan 42                38          41          40          91     98     95    
Surface 29               18         62    
Aquifer 26               20         78    
Huai 96                53          57          61          55     59     64    
Surface 74               40         54    
Aquifer 39               13         33    
Huang 74                36          40          39          48     54     53    
Surface 66               27         42    
Aquifer 41               8           20    
South 2,406           281        330        352        12     14     15    
Surface 2,376          269       11    
Aquifer 659             17         3      
Chang 961              135        164        168        14     17     17    
Surface 951             129       14    
Aquifer 246             7           3      
Zhu 471              66          73          85          14     15     18    
Surface 468             66         14    
Aquifer 112             1           1      
Southeast 259              19          29          31          7       11     12    
Surface 256             19         7      
Aquifer 61               1           1      
Southwest 585              4            6            10          1       1       2      
Surface 585             4           1      
Aquifer 154             0           0      
Interior Basins 130              56          58          58          43     45     45    
Surface 116             52         45    
Aquifer 86               9           10    
* The sum of surface and aquifer water exceeds the total water resources by the amount of overlap be
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 1991, 2003 (Annex 2)
Table 2.2   China: Water Availability and Human Use
Water Use                  
(BCM)
Water Use Relative to 
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2.1.2 Surface Water Diversion Is Excessive -- Resulting in Inadequate Water 
Flows to Flush Channels and Supply Downstream Needs 
 
Water scarcity is most acute north of the Yangtze River, particularly in the catchments of 
the Huai, Hai12, and Huang (Yellow) Rivers13. Since the 1980s, water shortages have been 
growing in magnitude and frequency of occurrence for urban industry, domestic 
consumption, and irrigated agriculture, creating severe economic losses. Total water 
shortages in 2000 were calculated at 38.8 billion m³ and projected to be 56.5 billion m³ by 
2050 unless measures are taken to reduce demands and to augment supplies. These 
shortages were estimated to cost the Chinese economy between 5 billion Yuan and 8.7 
billion Yuan p.a. (USD 620 million and USD 1.06 billion)14. However, as will be noted in 
the section on policy and investment implication these types of calculations can be 
misleading as they presume that the water deficit can be fully closed by augmenting water 
supply at reasonable cost which is not the case. 
 
The Yellow River Basin drains an area of almost 800,000 km², and serves a population of 
over 100 million, with an annual flow of 707 m³/person. The water utilization rate in the 
Yellow River is about 90% of the available water – which is close to complete water 
resources exploitation – creating severe problems for people and nature15. “The Yellow 
River -- the World’s fourth largest river -- once referred to as “China’s sorrow” because its 
high waters caused so much destruction, has been running dry in places since 1985”16. A 
study in 2001 noted that “in recent years the water flows at the deltas of the Hai and 
Yellow rivers have averaged about 15 billion m³ less than the amount required to transport 
silt and to maintain estuarine and coastal environments”17 and that the duration of low flow 
periods in the river has increased from forty days in early 1990s to two hundred days in 
1997. Another study suggests that “reserving even a bare minimum of 25% of the total 
flow of the Yellow River for the environment brings the basin to the level of absolute 
water scarcity”18.  
 
2.1.3 Groundwater Is Being Depleted – Causing Land Subsidence in Cities and 
Saltwater Intrusion along the Coast 
 
To compensate for surface water scarcity there is growing reliance on groundwater in the 
North.  Groundwater is being depleted at a faster rate than it is being replenished – leading 
to “mining” of aquifers. When aquifers are “mined” they are not available as an insurance 
in drought periods, thereby compromising sustainable use of the resource for current, as 
well as, future generations. In some areas, the destruction of aquifers is contributing to 
drought and dust storms and creating urban refugees from fragile lands. 
                                                 
12 In the densely populated Hai river basin, for example, industrial output is growing rapidly, and the basin is 
intensively cultivated.  However, water availability per capita is only 343 m³  per year, in contrast to 
residents in the Pearl River basin in the wet area of China who have 9 times more water available per capita.   
13 So called 3H rivers. 
14 Economy. “The Case of China” 1997. These numbers were calculated for all China as of 1997.   
15 WRI Research Report 2. p.17. 
16 Economy. 2004. p.69. 
17 World Bank. 2002b 
18 WRI Research Report 2. P.17.   10
The extent of the “mining” of groundwater is quite severe (e.g. sustainable groundwater 
flows in the Hai Basin have been estimated to be on the order of 17.3 billion m³ per annum 
while 1998 withdrawals were 26.1 billion m³ per annum) -- indicating an over-extraction 
as high as 8.8 billion m³ annually.  As a result, groundwater tables have dropped up to 90 
meters in the Hai plains19.  In Beijing it is estimated that groundwater tables have dropped 
by 100-300 meters  (anecdotal evidence suggests that some deep wells around Beijing now 
have to reach 1000 m to tap fresh water increasing dramatically the cost of supply).  
 
The removal of underground water domes has many different adverse consequences. It has 
resulted in salt-water intrusion along coastal provinces, by one-estimate 72 locations 
covering an area of 142 km². It is also leading to subsidence in coastal and non-coastal 
areas. The subsidence is large, up to several meters in cities like Beijing, Tianjin, Taiyuan, 
Shijiazhuang, and Shanghai, causing damage to buildings and bridges, and even their 
collapse (one estimate is Y 1.14 billion Yuan in damage to structures in 1985).  Subsidence 
is also lowering flood protection and exacerbating water logging in urban areas because 
drainage is less effective20.   
 
2.1.4 Water Shortages Are Also Emerging in Rapidly Growing Urban Sub-
regions in Other Parts of China – Both North and South 
 
While the problems in Beijing, and the Hai river basin are well known, they are not unique. 
In the relatively dry regions in the North, Northwest and Northeast there are many large 
urban centers, including seven cities with populations in excess of 2 million people each, 
and 81 cities with populations of 200,000-500,000 people each. In many of the major cities 
urban water use has also increased as mayors have embarked on beautification campaigns 
to plant trees, shrubs, flower, and grass along roadways and in municipal parks21, in part to 
attract new investments and higher skilled labor and in part to combat locally the effects of 
dust storms associated with surface and aquifer water depletion elsewhere. These large 
Chinese cities continue to compete with agriculture for scarce water resources.  The 
problems are emerging in acute forms in other metropolitan sub-regions with very fast 
growth. It is estimated that more than 400 of China’s 600 cities are short of water and 
about 100 face serious water shortage problems22.  
 
2.2 Quality of Water -- Is Deteriorating Because of Pollution, Thereby 
Aggravating Existing Water Shortages 
 
Currently, most of the water bodies in China are polluted and some are heavily polluted. 
Surface and groundwater pollution now represents a very large problem both for public 
health and the environment.  Pollution degraded water (quality) exacerbates the shortage 
(quantity) of water resources available downstream. It also makes it difficult to recycle 
water where it is scarce. As such pollution represents a growing constraint on national 
development objectives. 
                                                 
19 World Bank 2002b. P.2.   
20 World Bank 2002b. P.2. 
21 USDA. 2000. P.26. 
22 Wang and Somik. 2002. P.760. (Singer 1990)   11
 
In 2003, 38.1% of China's river waters overall were considered to be polluted, (up from 
33% a decade earlier). According to The State Environmental Protection Administration’s 
(SEPA) annual report23, over 70% of the water in five of the seven major river systems – 
the Huai, Songhua, Hai, Yellow, and Liao – was grade IV or worse i.e. it could not meet 
any designated beneficial uses.  For Hai and Huai it was 80%. Even the majestic Yangtze 
suffered a deep decline in water quality, more than doubling the percentage of its water not 
suitable for human contact to 48.5% in 200224.  
 
2.2.1 Sources of Pollution – Are Currently Evenly Divided Between Rural and 
Urban Areas 
 
Overall, 50% of water pollution is caused by non-point sources (in rural areas), including 
nutrient runoff, pesticides, and emissions from intensive livestock production, and the 
remaining 50% by industrial and municipal wastewater discharges and the leaching of 
solid waste25.  
 
Rural: Non-point sources of water pollution include (i) fertilizer runoff, (ii) pesticide 
runoff, and (iii) discharges from intensive animal production enterprises. They are serious 
problems, especially in certain rural areas, and can be expected to increase in the 
immediate future.   
 
(i) Nutrient runoff causes eutrophication, which is occurring in many lakes throughout 
China and also in near-shore marine areas that are shallow and/or experience limited tidal 
flushing. For example, about 70 % of nutrient inflow into Lake Chao and Lake Dian is 
derived from agricultural runoff. China is now the biggest pesticide producer and 
consumer in the world. In 1999, 625,000 tons pesticides were produced domestically and 
1.32 million tons pesticides were consumed26.  
 
(ii) Most domestically produced insecticides and pesticides are classified as “high-toxicity, 
high-residue chemicals.” Two of the three top insecticides produced in 1996 were WHO 
Class 1 chemicals. Pesticide residues in crops and adverse impacts on biodiversity are a 
result of killing insects on an indiscriminate basis. These effects are highly visible 
especially in wealthier, high growth areas in China27.   
 
(iii) Livestock production has increased its contribution to Gross Value of Agricultural 
Output from 14 % in 1970 to 31 % in 1998. This trend is expected to continue in the 
foreseeable future as urbanization increases, disposable incomes increase, and food 
distribution systems in rural areas improve. Within the livestock sector, pork production is 
of major importance accounting for 70 % of all meat produced in China and 50 % of pork 
                                                 
23 Energy Information Administration (EAI) 2003. “Country Analysis Briefs” (SEPA State of the 
Environment in China 2003.) 
24 Economy. 2004. P.69. 
25 World Bank 2004. 
26 World Bank 2001b. p.49-51. 
27 World Bank 2001b. p. 59-61.   12
production in the world. Amongst rural economic activities, family owned livestock 
operations are one of the most polluting28. Rural sources of pollution, such as livestock 
operations, rural industry and towns/villages remain essentially uncontrolled and 
unaccounted for by current government management programs29.   
 
Urban: The rapid growth in urban populations and industrial activities has also been 
accompanied by a rapid rise in the level of pollution in China’s waterways.  In the absence 
of sufficient water treatment plants, large volumes of raw sewage are dumped daily into 
local streambeds, and industrial water is often untreated.  When upstream water is returned 
to the stream polluted, water quality downstream is degraded.  In some cases, polluted 
water in the streams has seeped into ground water 30. Government monitoring and 
enforcement programs are having only limited impact for a number of reasons: selective 
application of the laws and weak enforcement at the local level; the absence of load based 
standards; and the setting of inappropriate standards that are not achievable given China’s 
current level of technology and low level of fines.    
 
“More than 75% of the water in rivers flowing through China’s urban areas is unsuitable 
for drinking or fishing.” “Only 6 of China’s 27 largest cities’ drinking water supply meet 
State standards. Many urban river sections and some large freshwater lakes are so polluted 
that they cannot even be used for irrigation”31.  
 
2.2.2 Types of Pollution -- Wastewater Discharge by Municipalities is Growing 
Relative to Industries, but Toxic Loads Are Undocumented 
 
In 2000, the major water pollutant -- COD discharge -- was almost evenly split between 
industrial and municipal sources, at approximately 7.4 million tons and 7.05 million tons 
respectively. Municipal wastewater and COD discharge has been growing relative to 
industrial wastewater discharge over time and by 2000, municipal wastewater discharge (at 
22.1 billion tons) was 14% (or 2.7 billion tons) more than industrial wastewater 
discharge32. The costs of benefits foregone by not treating wastewater were estimated at 4 
billion Yuan in 2000 rising to 23 billion Yuan in 205033 in the Hai and Huai basins.   
 
Municipal wastewater discharge is expected to grow in tandem with the growth in urban 
populations (if not in the growth in their per capita incomes). This rate was 3.1 % in the 
1990s, and is expected to be even larger over the next 10 to 20 years.  
 
Disaggregating the total industrial discharge into sectors shows that six sectors 
(pulp/paper, food, chemicals, textiles, tanning, and mining) accounted for 87 % of total 
industrial COD load but only 27 % of gross industrial output value.  
                                                 
28 World Bank 2001b. p. 61-62. 
29 Wang. 2004. 
30 USDA. 2000. 
31 Economy. 2004. 
32 Wang. 2004. p.8. 
33 World Bank 2002b. P.1.   13
Toxic pollution loads are undocumented, but estimated to be about 1.7% of total COD 
loads representing a significant threat to public health and aquatic systems. High pollution 
loads in the water will also seriously affect the pollution of coastal zone waters, which 
today do not meet coastal zone standards for marine aquatic life34.  
 
 
3.  The Trends in Water Demand Are Best Illustrated 
Sectorally 
 
Aggregate water use in China (i.e. water for human needs) is traditionally disaggregated 
into four categories – two reflecting production related demand by farms and factories 
(agriculture and industry) and two reflecting consumption related demand by households 
(rural and urban) (Table 3.1).  
 
80-02 80-97 97-02
BCM % BCM % BCM % BCM % % % %
TOTAL 444       100 519    100 557      100 550      100 1.0 1.3 -0.2
Production 416       94 469    90     504     91     488     89 2.7 1.1 -0.7
Agricultural 370       83 380    73 392      70 374      68 0.04 0.3 -1.0
Industrial 46         10 89      17 112      20 114      21 4.3 5.4 0.4
Domestic 28         6 50      10     53       9       62       11 3.7 3.7 3.3
Urban 6.8        1.5 24      4.6 25        4.4 32        5.8 7.3 7.9 5.3
Rural 21.3      4.8 26      5.0 28        5 30        5.4 1.5 1.6 1.4
Source: Water Resources Development in China 1994 and IIASA (1980, 1993) Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2003 (1997, 2002)
Table 3.1  China: Water Use
Water Use




3.1 Water Demand for Production purposes – by Farms and Factories 
 
Agriculture: Agriculture remains the largest user of water in China – accounting for ~70% 
of the total. However, in the 20 year period from 1980 to 2002, water used annually in 
agriculture increased only marginally from 370 billion m³ to 374 billion m³ (i.e. by a mere 
2% over two decades) (Table 3.1). In fact, the amount of water used for irrigation actually 
declined by over 4%, from 358 to 343 billion m³ (between 1980 to1993) as industrial and 
urban needs pre-empted agricultural needs35, and as productivity (efficiency) of water use 
in agriculture increased.  
 
The role of water pricing in rural areas of China is negligible because, for a long time, 
government policy kept water prices low as part of a larger strategy to keep farmers in 
their fields in order to avoid the huge social implications of a rush to the cities. This has 
had the side effect of encouraging wasteful use of water in inefficient crops and 
activities36. China recently re-emphasized the policy of food (grain) self-sufficiency. 
                                                 
34 Wang. 2004. P.7. 
35 Wang. 2004. 
36 Generally, water is not measured for individual farms or groups of farms. Instead water charges are based 
on crop type / area planted at the diversion point quite a bit upsteam. This could change with the   14
Despite that, there has been some progress in shifting to less water-intensive crops and 
activities in agriculture. However, this shift has been brought about through administrative 
means rather than through economic pricing of water.    
 
Industry:  Industry has been the second most important source of demand for water. Since 
economic reforms were initiated in the early 1980s, China’s economic growth has been 
rapid, particularly in the non-agricultural sectors.  Between 1980 and 2002, water use in 
industry increased from 46 to 114 billion m³, an increase of 250% in two decades (Table 
3.1). Industry now accounts for 21% of the total37. Together the production sectors account 
for 90% of water demand.     
 
Some have argued that water demand by industry may be decelerating as industries are 
becoming more water-efficient or shifting towards sub-sectors with lower-water 
requirements38.  The evidence for this, however, is still anecdotal. Even if a shift is 
occurring, there is still the problem that Chinese industries as recently as the late 1990s 
were still consuming 4-10 times as much water as their counterparts in more industrialized 
countries39.   
 
3.2 Water Demand for Consumption Purposes – by Households 
 
Rural: Rural residential demand for water was 21 billion m³ in 1980, 4.8% of total use.  
By 2002, it had increased to 30 billion m³ or 5.4% of the total.   
 
As recently as 1997, according to the census of agriculture, only 17% of rural households 
had access to tap water. A major program to put in tap water systems for rural villages has 
been underway now for many years.  As this program progresses, more households will 
have access to regular supplies of tap water, and domestic/residential consumption of water 
in rural areas is expected to increase40.   
 
Urban: Urban residential water demand was insignificant in 1980 at 1.5% of the total. 
However, in the two decades 1980-2002, China entered a major phase of urbanization. The 
number of residents in China’s cities more than doubled -- from 191 million to an 
estimated 459 million and their per capita income has increased even more rapidly. As a 
result the urban residents’ share of total water use has quadrupled to almost 6% (in 
absolute terms urban water consumption in this period increased from 7 billion m³ to 32 
billion m³) as urban residents bought washing machines and rented apartments that 
included flush toilets and individual shower facilities, activities that increase per capita 
urban water use.  Urban areas experienced the biggest increase in water use relative to 
                                                                                                                                                    
establishment of ‘water user associations’ (WUA) and the introduction of water measurement and water 
charges based on volumetric consumption. 
37 Water withdrawals for industry on average in high-income countries: 59% of total water use. Low-income 
countries: 8% of total water use. 
http://www.wateryear2003.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=1607&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
38 University of British Columbia. Center for Human Settlement, 
39 Wang and Somik, 1997. 
40 USDA. 2000. p.26.   15
other sectors in the last two decades41 and now account for as much water use as in rural 
areas.    
 
Per capita water use in cities varies greatly by region.  In some areas, such as Beijing-
Tianjin, water use is probably rising at the quickest rate: annual domestic demand in 
Beijing rose from 552 million m³/year in 1993 to 829 million m³ in 2000. Despite that in 
Tianjin -- in the dry Hai basin -- residents still use only 135 liters of water per day, or less 
than 40% of the 339 liters per day used by residents in the wet urban areas in the southern 
province of Guangdong42.  
 
 
4.  Policy and Investment Implications 
 
China is a large country with a complex economy. Generalizations and “one size fits all” 
type recommendations are likely to be misleading. Unfortunately, more nuanced solutions 
to location-specific problems are difficult to summarize and complicated by the fact that 
some of the necessary information is not easily available in public documents, nor 
consistent across sources (in part because information sources vary in terms of their 
definitions and coverage and are rarely complete43).   
 
Many of the problems cited in the previous sections are well known to Chinese authorities 
and they have initiated a wide range of programs to cope with them. The status of 
implementing these programs is summarized in the Ministry of Water Resources’ (MWR) 
Water Resources Report 44.  In addition to the comprehensive overview45 of China’s water 
needs completed by MWR in 2002, the World Bank prepared a strategy document46 in 
2003, which outlines comprehensively the key actions necessary for the future.  In neither 
of these documents is there a quantitative assessment of how much of the different 
problems will be resolved by the different actions. Nor were the actions fully costed and 
sequenced.  But they do provide an excellent array of actions to be implemented.   
 
                                                 
41 Overall, domestic household consumption per capita has risen tenfold in the last five decades to 240 liter a 
day per person in 2000. University of British Columbia.   
42 USDA. 2000. p.26. 
43 Many instances of water scarcity are highly localized and are not reflected in national statistics.  In 
addition, the accuracy and reliability of information vary greatly among sub-national regions, and categories 
of information, as does the year in which the information was gathered.  As a result, establishing consistency 
between different variables within and across time periods is difficult.  All data should be considered order of 
magnitude estimates.   
44 MWR. 2003. “China Country Report on Sustainable Development – Water Resources.” 
45 <Chinese Title> “Zhong Guo Ke Chi Xu Fa Zhan Shui Zi Yuan Zhan Lue Yan Jie Bao Gao Ji” (Di Wu 
Juan & Di Jiu Juan December 2002) <English Title> Strategies for Sustainable Water Resources 
Development in China. (Water Publication December 2002) http://www.waterpub.com.cn/index.htm 
46 World Bank. 2003a.   16
By contrast, a joint Bank China study47 for the 3H basins48 -- the areas of most acute water 
shortages -- did quantify the issues and options.  It projected municipal and industrial water 
needs in the future, treating water requirements for irrigation as residual. On this basis it 
projected shortages of 56.5 bcm/year in 2050 for the area under investigation. Increasing 
water prices and improving efficiency could reduce projected shortages by 22%49. Reusing 
treated water could reduce shortages by another 4%. However, even with demand 
management and reuse measures shortages on the order of 42 bcm (resulting in economic 
losses of Y59 billion/year) would remain. Implementing the South-North transfer could 
reduce the remaining shortages by 19.44 bcm/year, but will not close the gap. For this 
reason it does not make sense to project water demand for irrigation as if supplies can be 
augmented at reasonable cost.  Instead it is better to project (i) future water resource 
availability and (ii) demand by Municipalities and Industries (M&I). The difference 
between the two will define the residual available for irrigation -- which in turn will define 
priorities for high value, low water use crops. Table 4.1 below shows the declining water 
availability for irrigation for different GDP growth rates through 2020 in the 3H basins. 
 
2000 2010 2020 2000 2010 2020 2000 2010 2020
Surface Water and Ground 
Water 118 132 135 118 132 135 118 132 135
Plus Transfer Water 14 18 18 14 18 18 14 18 18
Less Additional Water Needed for 
the Environment 01 51 5 01 51 5 01 51 5
Less Elimination of Groundwater 
Overexploitation 099 099 099
Equals Water Available for Use 132 126 129 132 126 129 132 126 129
Less M&I* Demand (includes 
demand mgt actions) 44 53 61 44 56 67 44 57 69
Equals Water Available for 
Irrigation 88 73 68 88 70 62 88 69 60
* Municipal and Industrial
Total Water Resources Available
Source: World Bank 2001
Table 4.1.  3-H Basin Water Availability and Use Projects with Different Annual Growth Rates
6.5% p.a 7.5% p.a 8.5% p.a
 
 
It is clear from reviewing these and other documents and reports on many of the projects 
that have been implemented recently, that China has had more success in dealing with 
investment needs to control flooding, restore forested watersheds, and to improve water 
                                                 
47 World Bank. 2002b. v1 p.viii. 
48 3H basins: Hai River, Huai River and Huang  (Yellow) River. The 3-H basins are the bread baskets of 
China, producing 67 percent of China’s wheat, 44 percent of its corn and 72 percent of its millet. The 3-H 
basins also account for 65 percent of China’s peanuts, 64 percent of its sunflower, 50 percent of its sesame 
and 42 percent of its cotton. Forty percent of China’s cultivated area is in the 3-H basins. They produce 31 
percent of China’s gross industrial output value, while the 3-H basins have only about 10 percent of China’s 
water resources. Two out of every five people in China live in the 3-H basins which contain 424 million 
people.  
49 World Bank. 2002b. v1 p.viii.   17
supply and waste water treatment than in managing demand through better pricing and 
conservation policies, and better institutional coordination of integrated water 
management programs at different jurisdictional levels – though there have been some 
successes (as in the Tarim Basin Project
50) that have not yet been generalized. The 
essential point emerging from this review is that expanding water supply -- at increasing 
marginal costs51 -- in a context where it is not being used efficiently, will only increase the 
drain on public resources and be ultimately unsustainable.  
 
Implementing effective demand management policies requires dealing with public goods 
differently from dealing with private goods  
 
Public Goods: By definition, public goods cannot be provided by markets.  In the absence 
of feedback through market prices/ signals, managing the environmental component of 
public goods requires feedback from scientific knowledge, (and public commitment to act 
on that knowledge) to restore critical ecosystem functions affected by inadequate and 
degraded (/polluted) water availability. Similarly, managing the social component of 
public goods requires feedback from communities, (and public commitment to act on this 
feed back) to correct damaging consequences to public health, as well as, to the livelihoods 
of vulnerable households arising from inadequate and degraded water availability.  
 
Private Goods: Expanding the role of markets and market price signals as a feedback 
mechanism in water allocation will go a long way in helping conserve the resource and 
allocate it to the highest economic use, as well as, to send signals on priority investment 
requirements. Expanding the role of water markets and prices is a corollary of expanding 
the role of markets in the production of private goods and services. However, the 
expansion of water markets and prices presupposes progress on establishing the 
institutional framework on property rights (water rights/entitlements), valuation, and 
appropriate measurement. Taxes and subsidies, as well as, educating farmers, firm 
managers, and households in water conservation options can also augment the role of 
water pricing where the latter provides insufficient information and incentives on the 
allocation of water. 
 
 
4.1. Trends Affecting Future Demand Projections 
 
4.1.1 Elasticity of Water Demand with Respect to GDP 
 
As noted above agriculture is still the largest consumer of water in China, but growth in 
demand has been greatest in urban and industrial use. In 2002, China consumed about 550 
billon m³ of water annually, of which 68.8% was used for agriculture, 21% for industry 
and 11% for household purposes (Table 3.1). Demand for water grew at an annual rate of 
                                                 
50 China - Second Tarim Basin Project, World Bank Project Appraisal Document 1998 
51 The likely capital cost of water resulting from the S-N transfer could be on the order of 245 billion Yuan 
for a flow of 19 bcm/year. Depreciating these costs and adding operating costs will likely require prices well 
in excess of those currently prevailing of less than a Yuan/cu m. (World Bank. 2001 “China Agenda for 
Water Sector Strategy for North China.” v 1 Main Report. P.55, 85 and 98 Table 4.20.)   18
7.3% for urban households and 4.3% for factories between 1980 and 2002 even as water 
demand for rural households and farms remained almost unchanged (Table 3.1).   
 
Using GDP in constant 1990 prices52, the elasticity of water demand in industry with 
respect to GDP (at ~.45) is still much higher than the elasticity of water demand in 
agriculture (at ~.01) in the period 1980-2002  (see table 4.2). However, this period really 
consists of two sub-periods with very different trends. In the period 1980-1997 the 
elasticity of water demand in industry was 10 times higher than it was in the period 1997-





This suggests that the production sectors were able to grow even as they reduced their 
demand for water. However, in the case of agriculture, real output grew at only half the 
rate it did in the previous period (2.8% vs. 5.5%) suggesting water shortages may be 
affecting growth opportunities, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence. Real industrial 
growth rates also decelerated from 12% to 9% between the 1980-1997 and 1997-2002 
periods. Again there have been anecdotal observations that water shortages are affecting 
growth opportunities in the sector. Thus, the observed drop in water use elasticity with 
respect to GDP growth has been accompanied by a drop in agricultural and industrial 
growth rates as water shortages limited investment and therefore growth opportunities. 
While there is substantial scope for improving water use efficiency in agriculture and 
industry in China, it is not clear whether over a 40-50 year period, improved efficiencies 
will be sufficient to fully offset water use requirements associated with very high GDP 
growth rates, as was done in the five year period 1997-2002. 
 
4.1.2 Long-term Water Use Trends 
 
In the absence of a China-wide simulation model it is difficult to analyze the implications 
of different scenarios. However, some aspects of future water demand can be analyzed 
with the aid of a simple simulation model. This is primarily an illustrative exercise to 
understand the key drivers of water demand at a broad-brush level. It is not capable of 
identifying location-specific policy priorities, or planning targets. 
 
The key variables in the model are population forecasts, changes in the urban-rural 
composition of the population, changes in the per capita water demand of rural and urban 
households, changes in the composition of production between primary (agriculture plus), 
                                                 
52 World Bank 2003b. 
1980-97  1997-2002 1980-02
TOTAL  0.133  -0.032 0.103
Agricultural  0.034  -0.124 0.005
Industrial  0.539  0.049 0.447
Urban  0.785  0.691 0.767
Rural  0.156  0.187 0.162
 Table 4.2 .  China: Elasticity of Water Use with respect to   19
secondary (manufacturing plus), and tertiary (services) activities. With these few variables 
one can show the sensitivity of the “aggregate demand for water” to different average GDP 
growth rates to 2050 -- if water demand per yuan of output does not change significantly in 
the various sub-sectors. This then provides a backdrop for comparing actions to 
aggressively increase the efficiency of water use in the sub-sectors vs. actions to 
aggressively increase water supplies – recognizing that the composition of the action 
portfolio will vary by region, river basin, and even locality.   
 
The projections use  
•  Two scenarios for population in 2050: (1) the UN medium term projection, 
assuming a growth rate of  0.2% per annum with the population peaking and then 
leveling off at 1.4 billion people by 2050; (2) the population of 1.6 billion in 2050 
which was used in the 3H study (and implicitly assumes a 0.45% per annum growth 
rate).  
•  The same urban-rural split and GDP structure for 2050 used in the 3H study.  
•  The assumption that the demand for water of rural and urban households will 
continue to grow but at different rates – varying between a fast one akin to the 
explosive growth in the 1980-1997 period, and a slow one akin to the growth in the 
period 1997-2002.  
 
Using these very simple assumptions, we find that the doubling of overall population 
growth rate from 0.2% to 0.45% p.a. has a negligible impact on water demand. The 
increase in the urban share of the population, however, is more significant particularly if 
the average demand for water of urban households continues to grow rapidly. But these 
changes in demand – not excessive in their own right -- will be more difficult to 
accommodate if there is not also a substantial deceleration and possibly even a decline in 
water demand by agriculture and industry.  
 
In other words, if the unit water consumption patterns of the latter do not change 
significantly, even though their share in GDP decreases, shortages will continue to grow 
and average GDP growth rates >5% p.a. over 50 years (say 7% p.a. in the first till 2025 
and 4% thereafter) will be difficult to sustain, as they could generate water demand in 
excess of China’s ability to supply at a reasonable cost.  
 
Even a 4% p.a. growth rate for the country through 2050 could generate the need to 
increase water supply in many growth areas in excess of 100%. To put this required 
increase in water in perspective – it is worthwhile to note that in the explosive GDP growth 
period of the last 20 years, (with its attendant industrialization and urbanization 
transformations) aggregate water demand grew by only 25% from 440 BCM to 550 BCM -
- with the 3H river basins and key metropolitan regions experiencing so much water 
shortage that they have had to resort to diverting water from downstream rural users and 
estuaries, as well as, pumping aquifers at a rate faster than replenishment -- which is 
ultimately unsustainable.    
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4.1.3 In the Scenarios above the Real Pressure on Water Demand Emanates 
from Lack of Efficiency Improvements in Water Use in Agriculture and 
Industry 
 
Thus, there is a strong premium on lowering water consumption patterns in the production 
sectors, i.e. towards agricultural and rural activities that are less water-intensive per unit of 
output, and to increase the re-use of water in industry.  
 
Clearly increasing the role of water pricing is necessary but not sufficient to ensure more 
efficient use of water. Government has recognized this and has started the process. But it 
will have to stay the course and steadily increase prices. At present, water prices are set 
administratively, without adequate and timely feedback, as would happen with market 
prices that reflected the balance between the costs of increasing supply versus benefits 
foregone if supply is not increased. 
 
 
4.2 The Utility of Prices as a Signaling Device Can Be Increased If 
Markets to Trade Water Rights Can Be Implemented with Appropriate 
Safeguards /Complementary Actions to Address Public Goods 
 
The average price of water increased from almost nothing, prior to 1980, to 0.038 USD per 
m³ in 1988, to 0.15 USD per m³ in 200353. Recent decisions54 suggest prices in some urban 
areas will be increased further in the next two years (e.g. in Beijing to 1.29 USD per m³
55 – 
nearly double the current price there). But the overall average price is still low both in 
terms of what is needed to reduce water wasted by households and industries (as noted 
earlier Chinese factories use 4-10 times as much water as factories in developed countries 
to produce an equal amount of goods), and by comparison with other countries where 
markets determine a larger proportion of prices – 0.47 USD per m³ in South Africa, 0.51 
USD per m³ in the USA, and 1.45 USD per m³ in Germany
56.  
 
There have been many studies exploring water-pricing reforms in China including different 
pricing methods (volumetric/marginal cost pricing; tiered pricing; two part tariffs <life-line 
plus commercial>; input-output pricing; per area pricing; etc.) 57 . Most have been 
theoretical. The 3H basin study included some estimates of price elasticity. But there have 
been no empirical studies of the impact on production (epecially in irrigation) of increasing 
prices or moves to increase cost recovery. Nor have there been any studies of willingness 
to pay. One study for irrigation 58  was underway in 2004.  
 
 
                                                 
53 IWHR. 2003. “China’s Reform of Water Prices for Irrigation: Effectiveness and Impact.” 
54 Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2004.  
55 The article uses 0.54 USD per ton (re-calculated by 1 ton  to 0.417 m³) 
56 The UN World Water Development Report ‘Valuing Water’ 
57 (Wang, etc., 2003; Li, etc. 2003 ; Jiang, 2000 ; Jia, 2000) Dinar, Ariel. 2004. “ Pricing Irrigation Water” 
Resources for the Future. 
58 op cit. China’s Reform of Water Prices for Irrigation: Effectiveness and Impact.   21














































Box 4.1.  Addressing the Water Scarcity Issue in Agriculture through Participation 
and Water Rights 
 
“A major water conservation program in irrigated agriculture is needed that focuses 
on increasing the agricultural production yield and economic value of production per unit of 
water consumed, while at the same time drastically reducing consumption. China has 
already made some progress in this regard, but a major escalation in effort is required.  
There is a need for a major program of agricultural research and training of technicians and 
farmers to increase yields and production value in conditions of partial supply and rain fed 
agriculture, as well as for full irrigation supplied areas.  China’s existing water savings 
program that focuses mainly on increasing irrigation system efficiencies is inadequate and 
partially misguided.  Much of the water losses in existing irrigation systems returns to the 
surface or groundwater system, and reducing these losses also reduces these return flows.  
  
Often improving irrigation system efficiencies results in an increase in agricultural 
consumption of water and a decrease in return flows, and therefore results in more water 
consumption rather than less.  The Bank supported Water Conservation Project, which 
began implementation in 2001 and the GEF Hai Basin Integrated Water and Environment 
Management Project focus on integrated irrigation, agriculture and on-farm management 
measures with the objective of increasing yields and value per unit of water consumed or in 
other words per unit of evapotranspiration (ET).  These projects will develop and 
demonstrate ways to achieve this objective.   
 
Measurement of water extracted from wells in irrigated areas is also usually not 
metered or charged for.  One of the major principles  to implementing an effective system of 
water conservation through demand management therefore will be implementing a system 
of measurement and volumetric charging at the lower ends of the irrigation delivery systems 
and in well systems.  Water user associations (WUAs) can takeover responsibility for the 
operation and maintenance of lateral-level irrigation systems with good measuring devices 
installed and monitored at the point of delivery to these systems.”   
 















































Box 4.1  (continued) 
 
“A third critical area of emphasis is the design and implementation of mechanisms 
that will facilitate the functioning of a system of tradable water rights.  Such a system would 
make a major contribution to increasing the value of production per unit of water consumed in 
irrigated agriculture areas and to the reallocation of water from agriculture to priority uses.  A 
significant amount of informal water trading already goes on in China.  Chinese water law 
includes provisions for the issuing of water licenses, but the issuing and enforcing of water 
licenses in irrigation areas is not widespread.  At each point of water measurement, a 
corresponding water right should be issued that includes: (a) a flow rate; (b) a total volume of 
allowable annual delivery/extraction; and (c) a total volume of allowable annual consumptive 
use.  The sum of all of the consumptive use rights for a river basin or aquifer should not 
exceed the allowable total consumptive use in the basin or aquifer in order to have sustainable 
water resources use and management.  Once the consumptive use water rights issued equal the 
allowable total consumptive use rights in a basin, no further water rights should be issued.  No 
water diversion or well drilling/pumping should be permitted without a corresponding water 
right.  Once a complete system of water rights/measurement is operational, then a system of 
tradable water rights could begin to function.  To ensure maintaining a water balance and no 
negative impacts on third parties, the consumptive use right is the right that should be traded.  
All water rights trades should be registered and approved by the government authorities 
ensuring no impact on third parties.  Without a complete system of consumptive use water 
rights and measurement, tradable water rights will not be able to aid in the reallocation of 
water within a sustainable water resources management system and therefore, trading in water 
rights should be restricted.”    
 
Source:  World Bank. 2004.  p. 3-4 
Box 4.2.  Addressing Water Scarcity in Agriculture through Complementary 
Institutional Reforms Such as Measurement and Monitoring  
 
“The action plan recognizes the important social and political (including food 
security) implications of maintaining adequate water supplies to rural areas for agriculture. At 
the same time, the cost to the government of supplying large volumes of water to low value-
added agricultural activity is no longer sustainable. Thus, the action plan focuses on structural 
and nonstructural components.  
 
The action plan recognizes the need to increase participatory mechanisms and to 
continue management reforms in order to develop innovative models for irrigation district 
management, including joint stockholder cooperatives, water supply companies, water user 
associations and self-financed irrigation and drainage districts. The proposed improvement 
components run in parallel with existing Chinese government programs, particularly the 
comprehensive agricultural development (CAD) program, the large irrigation district (LIS) 
program, and the water-saving program. These are focused on demand management, increased 
efficiency of water use, and appropriate pricing reviews without any augmentation of supply. 
The exception might be water supply derived from wastewater reuse schemes that may be 
available for market gardens in the peri-urban areas around cities. The action plan however 

























4.2.1 Addressing the Social Implications of Increasing the Role of Water 
Pricing  
 
Moving towards economic pricing of water requires that one addresses the impact on 
vulnerable groups in a manner that does not undermine improvements in allocative 
efficiency. 
  
For example, encouraging agriculture to shift out of water intensive activities (e.g. from 
wheat to livestock) through a steady increase in water charges could adversely affect many 
poor and vulnerable rural households. Essentially, as in the analysis on WTO Accession59 
removing implicit subsidies on a key input into agriculture (i.e. water), is likely to displace 
farmers and individuals with limited alternatives.  
 
“Beijing farmers are generally far poorer than their urban cousins, rural water costs only 
0.2 renminbi (Yuan) a cubic meter….but competition for resources is nevertheless growing 
as Beijing’s urban suburbs expand, making the use of precious water in the fields 
increasingly irrational”60. “Farmers cannot compete economically with industry for water 
in China (or anywhere else). The arithmetic is stark.  A thousand tons of water produces 
one ton of wheat, which has a market value of 1,600 Yuan ($200), while a thousand tons of 
water used in industry yields an estimated 112,000 Yuan ($14,000) of output, or 70 times 
                                                 
59 Anderson, Kym. 2002.  
60 Holland, Lorien. 2000. 
Box 4.2.  (continued) 
 
“A key aspect that needs to be strengthened in conjunction with the participatory 
institutional and water price measures is water measurement and volumetric water charging. 
Although everywhere in China irrigation water charges are stated in terms of cubic meters of 
water use, in reality there is a major lack of adequate water measurement at the lower end of the 
irrigation systems and the actual calculation of the water charge is based on the irrigated area and 
an average water usage rate, rather than on a measured delivery amount. Although there are no 
accurate data that can be generalized, anecdotal data have shown in China that when transparent 
water measurement and volumetric charging are introduced in specific areas (i.e. where there are 
no major distortions due to water shortages) in conjunction with water user associations, there is a 
reduction in the amount of water used. The action plan includes a program to introduce and 
strengthen water measurement and volumetric charging in conjunction with water user 
associations. 
 
The third part of the action plan for agriculture recommends that an integrated 
comprehensive approach be adopted in order to effect real water saving from the standpoint of the 
hydrological system. The integrated approach does not rely solely on engineering measures unlike 
the present National Irrigated Agricultural Water Saving Program, but instead focuses on (a) 
physical improvements to canal and on farm irrigation and drainage systems, (b) agronomic 
measures and (c) irrigation management measures.” 
 
Source:  Gunaratnum. 2004. p. 22   24
as much”61. In other words, a rise in prices to reflect economic scarcity is more easily 
absorbed by industrial enterprises (and urban households) than by many farmers (and rural 
households) engaged in grain production62. 
 
The competition for water could substantially reduce the acreage devoted to water-
intensive, low value grain production63. Reducing grain production by 13 million tons 
would free up 13 bcm of water (at current water use productivity rates in grain production 
of 1 kg/cu m) which is equivalent to the current excess water use in the Hai basin. 
However, reducing grain production is at odds with the current policy of food (grain) self-
sufficiency. The reduction in grain output will be less if water system efficiency 
improvements or implemented.  For example, reducing evaporation and transpiration could 
double water use productivity and cut the amount by which grain production would have to 
be reduced. But even then, it could be difficult to fully reconcile the competing objectives 
of no reduction in grain production while eliminating water deficits. 
 
Returns to water use can be increased by shifting to higher value crops but this could 
displace some grain farmers lacking the skills or complementary resources (credit and 
technical assistance) to manage the cultivation of higher value commercial crops. Some of 
these displaced farmers and households can be absorbed in other non-farm rural activities. 
But many cannot. This will create a push factor, stimulating rural to urban migration. This 
will not be undesirable, if a couple of precautions are addressed and implemented: 
 
Programs are introduced to facilitate rural to urban migration of vulnerable 
populations that cannot shift to other rural activities. These programs will have to 
also concentrate on providing assets to the rural poor (including education, training, 
improved property rights to access credit) so they have the skills to compete in 
urban labor markets (or become entrepreneurs in legal SMEs) and avoid falling 
below the poverty line again.   
 
New urban centers are identified that can absorb the migrant population both to 
satisfy the need to increase overall economic productivity (agglomeration 
economies, etc.), but also the need to avoid the increasingly costly water scarcities 
in existing large metropolitan centers. With some important exceptions, 
encouraging urbanization (and new infrastructure development) in areas that are 
not water scarce, or likely to become water scarce, may be an efficient long-term 
strategy. As is evident from table 1.1 above there has been a dramatic 
demographic shift from rural to urban areas between 1980 and 2000 (with the 
urban share increasing from 19% to 36% and the rural shares declining from 81% 
to 64%) which is associated with a quadrupling of the urban share in total water 
demand. However, there has been no noticeable demographic shift from North to 
South (relative shares remaining almost constant at 42% and 58% respectively) 
                                                 
61 WWI. 2004.  
62 Dinar, Ariel. 2004.  
63 China’s water shortages could result in massive grain imports and higher global grain prices.  (Lorien 
Holland 2000.)   25
despite the growing water scarcities in the North64. This is an anomaly that requires 
further analysis -- but lack of adequate price signals on the real economic costs of 
water could be one factor.   
 
Efforts are made to reduce the exposure to a set of risks that can arise if the poor 
rural migrant populations are forced to live on cheaper land (e.g. in vulnerable 
flood plains, or near polluted water basins).   
 
Thus, to address water scarcities it is not going to be sufficient to focus just on economic 
efficiency criteria.  Social issues also need to be addressed as an integral part of a broader 
program 
 
4.2.2 Addressing the Environmental Implications of Increasing the Role of 
Water Pricing 
 
Demand management strategies – including conservation measures -- are essential not just 
to reduce water wastage, but also to reduce the need for costly inter-basin water transfers.  
Allowing or encouraging continued urbanization also requires that the collateral damage 
associated with expanding urban water demand be lowered. Using freshwater would be 
less consequential if water abstracted upstream could be returned to river flows in good 
condition to be used again downstream. This can only be done if water polluted through 
urban and industrial use is treated appropriately first. Thus, in urban areas -- in comparison 
to rural areas -- not only must water prices go up faster, but so should the charges for waste 
water discharges and other pollutants (combined with better monitoring and information 
disclosure, and enforcement of appropriate standards).   
 
4.3 Reducing the Cost of Wastewater Treatment and Improving Its 
Monitoring 
 
Increasing wastewater charges (specially the speed by which charges increase) will be 
easier if there is better monitoring and information disclosure, and if more wastewater is 
treated for re-use. The latter requires that increases in wastewater charges be 
complemented by lowering the cost of investment in wastewater treatment plants. 
 
“Public Disclosure of Information” on water quality and “Community Consultation” can 
improve feedback and facilitate better monitoring: Jiangsu Province, SEPA, and the World 
Bank have done research on pilot versions of community consultation and feedback 
processes, as well as Public Disclosure of Information and determined that they have the 
potential to be scaled-up65. 
 
                                                 
64  The only caveat is the possibility that official data underestimates the extent of migration of the population 
from the north to the South analogous to the underestimation of the population in urban areas due to 
unregistered (non-hukou) migrants as noted in Fan, Cindy and Vernon Henderson.   
65 Jiangsu Environmental Protection Bureau Conference on “Environmental Information Disclosure” August 
13, 2004.    26
There is a need to improve Local Budgetary relationships: Many waste water treatment 
plants have been built but are operating well below capacity, or even zero capacity, 
because revenues collected from customers are transferred to the general city budget and 
not allocated to ensure that the treatment plants have the necessary resources with which to 
operate 66.     
 
There is a need to improve Investment Coordination across metropolitan regions: It is 
clear that there are economies of scale and optimal size of wastewater treatment plants. 
When municipalities respond to national directives by trying to implement their own 
separate wastewater treatment plants there is a real possibility that the overall national 
costs of the wastewater treatment program will be excessive.   
 
Widening options considered for wastewater investment decisions may make a difference: 
As noted in the World Development Report 200367, New York City found that it was 
cheaper to repurchase land along part of its watershed that had been sold for development, 
than to build an expensive water treatment plant. This was possible because the topography 
provided for a natural filtration process that was very effective. This will not be an 
appropriate option in all cases, but it may be in some cases. More importantly, it may show 
the possibility of other more cost-effective solutions, which combine land development 
restrictions, and restoration of local watershed filtration capacities to reduce the amount of 
water needing treatment and therefore the cost of the overall program for wastewater 
treatment in China. 
 




















                                                 
66 Based on informal communications with the author of on-going "City Development Strategy" (CDS) in 11 
cities in China. 
67 WDR 2003a. p.26. 
Box 4.3.  Reducing Water Pollution  
 
“The action plan recommends structural, nonstructural and institutional investments 
and programs to strengthen existing government efforts designed to improve declining water 
quality trends.  
 
Pollution from urban municipal sources would be managed by the use of updated 
municipal sewerage systems, including collecting sewers and treatment plants, designed to 
have capacity also for receiving industrial wastewater. This use would result in large savings 
both to the municipality and industries because of economy of scale for treatment for removal 
of degradable organics (with the provision that participating industries would first remove 
toxic and other objectionable substances by using in-plant treatment before discharging to the 
municipal system). The treated municipal effluent would be reused to the extent practicable as 
water supply for irrigation and for industries. In addition, the municipal systems would 
include provisions for effective use of onsite excreta disposal units for homes and buildings 
not connected to municipal sewers. The same provision would apply to rural homes.” 



























4.4 Augmenting Water Supply 
 
Demand management policies through market prices may not be sufficient to deal with the 
full range of environmental water problems facing China.  It is easier, to introduce water 
charges when scarcity has emerged but critical thresholds have not yet been crossed.  It is 
more difficult to introduce water pricing and waste water charges when implicit rights have 
been acquired and critical thresholds crossed.  
 
Two such thresholds in China are: (1) the lack of adequate water in rivers to ensure year 
round flows to flush the rivers, transport silt to the delta, and avoid ecosystem damage 
down stream – all of which are already occurring;  and (2) the need to restore some, if not 
all the ground water, that has been over-pumped in the recent past.  In both these cases, 
more water flow has to be restored to the ecosystem and aquifers.  
 
It might be possible to do that by setting the price so high that existing users voluntarily 
renounce some of their water claims. But in the absence of water markets and well-defined 
water rights it may not be possible to fully restore the minimum requisite water abstracted 
from rivers that now run dry. More importantly, ecosystem needs are public goods and by 
definition difficult to include in water markets (today, when dry weather flows in rivers are 
Box 4.3.  (Continued) 
 
“Industries in urban areas would reduce waste production by use of cleaner technology 
and would dispose of wastewater, after removal of toxics, by reuse, discharge to environment, or 
discharge to municipal systems. Rural industries, including livestock operations and township 
and village enterprises (TVEs), represent a large pollution source that has been given little 
attention. Addressing the problem, the action plan would require livestock operators to utilize 
stabilization treatment ponds, and would require TVEs to utilize adequate treatment facilities for 
TVE types that can afford this, and otherwise plan for gradual phasing out of TVE types that 
cannot afford to comply. The overall pollution control program would also include attention to 
promoting adequate solid waste management in both urban and rural sectors, so that these 
wastes would not be left unmanaged and subject to being flushed into waterways by surface 
runoff. 
 
The nonstructural part of the action plan for water pollution is equally ambitious. The 
main components include (a) review of water quality standards, both ambient and emission, and 
revision of these to be practicable and appropriate for use in China, including the 3-H basins, 
with emission standards based on mass rather than concentration units; (b) establishment of a 
permit system whereby municipalities can control waste discharges from industries, including 
effective monitoring and enforcement of their performance; (c) use of the environmental impact 
assessment process for all major waste polluters to reinforce the permit system operations; and 
(d) coordination of the basin water-quality monitoring programs operated by the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and MWR to eliminate overlapping and to fill 
important gaps.” 
 
Source: Gunaratnum. 2004. p. 23    28
low, water for environmental needs have to come from a reduction in irrigation).  This will 
















Other investments in infrastructure such as a “catchments reservoirs” and watershed 
management in “catchments basins”, e.g. through re-forestation, to stabilize damaging 
unevenness in water flows over time are other examples of supply oriented interventions 
that need to complement demand management policies where there are externalities and 
public goods involved.  For the future, some augmenting of existing supplies e.g. through 
























Box 4.4  Institutional Reforms to Restore Groundwater  
 
“The key actions required by the action plan are: (a) definition of groundwater 
management units with determination of sustainable yields; (b) preparation of groundwater 
management plans; (c) allocation licensing linked to sustainable yield and undertaken by one 
department only; (d) licensing of well construction drillers; (e) development of a national 
groundwater database; and (f) preparation and implementation of a groundwater pollution 
control strategy, including provision in selected cities for recharging of groundwater by 
spreading of treated wastewater effluents or of floodwaters on permeable spreading areas, and 
for injection of treated effluents to establish groundwater mounds to prevent salinity intrusion 
into freshwater aquifers.” 
 
Source: Gunaratnum. 2004. p.24. 
Box 4.5.  Water Scarcity and Water Resource Development 
 
“The proposed action plan recommends two key measures for demand management to 
reduce water demands to minimum feasible levels: (a) water price increases for all use sectors so 
that revenues would reflect cost of supply and scarcity, and (b) a series of measures for increasing 
water use efficiency in all sectors.  
These demand management measures alone, however, would not reduce demands sufficiently to 
match available basin supply. Hence the action plan proposes two key measures for augmenting 
supply, namely: 
(a) systematic increase in reuse of treated wastewaters. As shown by experience in industrial 
countries, treated municipal wastewaters represent a very valuable source of supplemental water 
supply for industrial raw water supply and for irrigation of urban area green zones and farming. 
Hence the action plan would incorporate provisions for planning of municipal sewerage systems to 
facilitate reuse. Such planned reuse would be subject to regulatory control by use of the permit 
system, to ensure attention to needs for protecting public health,  
(b) interbasin S-N transfer. Because such a transfer is very expensive, a primary goal of the 
action plan is to reduce the need for transfer to the minimum feasible levels by implementing 
demand management and institutional reforms, simultaneously with supply augmentation methods. 
With the supply augmentation measures it is also necessary to improve, rehabilitate and expand all 
city supply, wastewater treatment and drainage systems on the S-N transfer routes to ensure more 
efficient water distribution and drainage.”  
 
Source: Gunaratnum. 2004. p.21.   29
4.5 There Is a Clear Coordination Function That Requires Addressing 
Institutional Issues If Policies and Programs Are to Be Implemented 
Within a Reasonable Budget and Time Frame 
 
A number of recent World Bank reports such as the “Water Resources Assistance Strategy 
for China 2002,” and the “Agenda for Water Sector Strategy for North China68” provide a 
useful set of actions that need to be implemented.  However, a serious problem noted in 
both is that: “Current institutional arrangements do not permit a coherent integrated 
approach to solving these urgent and complex problems due to the fragmented nature of 
the mandates of the Ministries and uncertain relations between provincial and central 
governments. Existing river basin commissions operate under the aegis of the Ministry of 
Water Resources and because they do not include the active participation of the provinces 
or other ministries, are unable to exercise much influence in regard to water resources 
management. Water allocations are based on periodic negotiations, which are mostly not 
honored because of inadequate monitoring, modeling and forecasting, and a lack of 
institutional mechanisms for enforcement”69. The need to strengthen substantially the role 
of River Basin Commissions has been noted as a priority institutional change in a number 

























                                                 
68 2002. 
69 World Bank. 2002b.  
Box4. 6. Institutional Management of River Basins  
 
“The role that institutions play in the management of water resources is critical and 
paramount for the success of the proposed action plan. A number of key recommendations must 
be implemented to support proper functioning of the action plan’s structural components. These 
include: (a) establishing high-level River Basin Coordinating Councils (RBCNs) in each of the 
basins, controlled by boards with balanced presentation from both central government and 
provincial and local governmental agencies; (b) giving the RBCNs authority for determining 
water resource allocations and developing water resource policies for optimal overall basin 
water resource utilization; (c) reorienting the existing River Basin Commissions (RBCMs) to 
serve as the working arms for the RBCNs, including review of water charges for all sectors; (d) 
establishing provincial water resource coordinating committees for the management of water 
resources at the local levels; (e) ensuring that only one agency be charged with permits for 
resource extraction; (f) transferring management of irrigation districts to local institutions 
following a consultative process; and (g) arranging for enlargement of the scope of the permit 
system in municipalities that receive expensive imported water to cover all “water handlers,” 
including water supply, water uses, and wastewater treatment and reuse, to ensure optimal use 
of both local and imported water.” 
 
Source: Gunaratnum. 2004. p.24.   30
4.6 A Broader and More Detailed Analysis of Socio-economic Options Is 
Needed to Complement the Comprehensive 2002 Study on Technical 
Water Options for China  
 
How should China deal with the increasing demand for water arising from its ongoing 
rapid urbanization and industrialization? Should it emphasize demand management policies 
-- because water supply is physically constrained (i.e. cannot be augmented locally with 
current technologies at reasonable economic cost), or should it emphasize investment in 
infrastructure to ensure greater supply of water in the near and medium term -- because 
there are no real physical or technical constraints (only economic/financial ones)? Or, if 
both are needed, what should be the balance in a portfolio of actions ? 
 
The analysis in this note -- regarding current status, trends and projections – suggests the 
need for more in-depth work for different classes of locations in a framework that is 
regionally and nationally consistent to quantify the likely cost and impact of action 
priorities for surface and ground water, based on the actions already outlined in  documents 
cited earlier.  With that type of work it should be possible, to indicate the proportion of the 
problem that is likely to be solved by the different actions, and the likely costs associated 
with individual actions or groups of actions. 
 
This analysis will have to be augmented with additional work analyzing different scenarios 
and trajectories of demand. In particular, there is a real need to study willingness to pay 
and other methods for analyzing demand responses to different pricing options.  In the 
absence of such work it is difficult to give strong prescriptions, many of which are likely to 
vary by locality in importance.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Of the many actions discussed in this review, the following three stand out as perhaps the 
most significant: 
 
(1) Allocate water for public uses (such as estimated ecosystem water needs ) first 
before allocating water to private uses (industry, residential -- rural and urban, and 
agriculture as the residual claimant) and regulate both (e.g. to protect public 
health).  
 
(2) Shift from administrative to price allocation of water -- initially through better 
technocratic analysis, and eventually complemented through water markets based 
on fair and transparent allocation of property rights in water.  Markets cannot 
totally replace administrative (quota) allocations for reasons that are well known 
and implicit in the recommendation above regarding public/private use of water. 
The balance between the two allocation mechanisms (administrative vs market) 
will be determined politically, though good technocratic analysis can inform the 
political debate. 
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(3) Improve the institutions involved in water management -- including better 
coordination of water use through invigorated river basin/watershed mgt 
commissions and greater involvement of communities in joint monitoring and 
enforcement through public disclosure schemes.  
 
Two important ancillary recommendations are:  
 
(i) Increase urban water recycling through more reliable and cost-effective 
sewerage treatment, and  
 
(ii) Commission additional studies to analyse socio-economic options (such as 
willingness to pay/ ability to pay for different services in different locations) 
beyond those considered in the 2002 water study. 
 
In summary, the biggest challenge will be for national and local governments to craft 
policies and rules within China’s complex cultural and legal administrative system that 
provide incentives for users to increase efficiency of water use, and for polluters to clean 
up the water they use and return clean water to stream flows. Using a standard public 
economics framework, water requirements for public goods – such as ecosystem needs – 
should be set aside first, before allocating property rights in water (to enable water markets 
to function and generate efficient allocation signals70). Even then, water markets will have 
to be regulated to ensure public goods, such as public health, are not compromised. Until 
water markets are implemented, staying the course on increasing water and wastewater 
prices administratively and encouraging water conservation are necessary to reduce the 
wasting of current scarce water resources, as well as the new water supplies to be provided 
in the future.    
 
 
                                                 
70 The new South African Water Act of 1997 considers its Water Resources as a public good, a resource for 
all, under state control and licensed, whereas in the past water in rivers, groundwater or captured was 
considered a private good, owned by the landowner.  http://www.thewaterpage.com/SolanesDublin.html , 
The water laws in China have been revised recently to address the public goods issues raised above. 
(Xiangyang 2004).      32
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